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Introduction
It is encouraging to note that questions about the 
'relevance' of social sciences, sociology, history 
and philosophy of medicine to medical science 
and practice do not resound merely in depart­
ments of social medicine and medical humanities. 
Methodological and conceptual trends in health 
care studies — such as the increase of longitudinal 
approaches, and greater sensitivity to multi­
causality and the complexity of life trajec­
tories — are but a few indicators of the impact of 
social science on health care research.1 The 
attention of medical practitioners today is increas­
ingly drawn to important ideas that derive from 
debates in medical humanities research, such as 
the notion of relativism and the advantages and 
disadvantages of relativist perspectives, or the 
concept of 'network' and the relevance for health 
care workers of focusing on interest groups to 
better understand the course of scientific research 
and practice. And so it is that an increasing 
number of medical authors are embracing recent 
insights in the history, philosophy, sociology and 
anthropology of medicine.
Indeed, many contemporary studies in the 
social sciences and medical humanities have
*
raised our awareness of the extent to which 
medical practices and interpretations are socially 
embedded, locally varied and historically con­
tingent. Many such studies make us acknowledge 
that the field of medicine is both deeply 
entrenched in the social world, and is a social 
and cultural system itself. Yet the key question 
remains: how best to describe the fine relation­
ships that make up medicine, conceived as a
social and cultural system? Many authors main­
tain that a clear answer to this question is more 
likely to come from studies in the medical 
humanities than by turning to research in the 
(medical) natural sciences. However, although 
we welcome critical interest in situating medicine 
socially, we wonder whether the types of ques­
tioning that silently continue to presume an in 
principle divide between medical humanities and 
natural sciences should be those we ought to 
carry over into the 21st century. A growing 
number of scholars who care about the future of 
medicine as a social and cultural system feel that 
the semantic division into 'the humanistic' and 
'natural scientific' in medicine is counter-produc­
tive. It does not foster more sensitive forms of 
medical self-description, and hampers the devel­
opment of finer-tuned conceptual tools for 
medical action and self-evaluation,
The Historical Distinction Between Natural 
and Human Sciences: Divisions of Labour, 
Territory and Language
The distinction between (medical) humanities 
and (medical) natural sciences represents a 
relatively recent historical construct. Over the 
past four centuries the world of universal scienlia 
has undergone a complex transformation, which 
has generated particular divisions of territory and 
institutions, labour and language. In the broadest 
sense this separation can be cast as a division 
between Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwis- 
senschaften. This distinction was institutionally
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consolidated in the course of the 19th century, 
albeit against considerable opposition.
Throughout, the complex process of 'creating 
the divide between natural sciences and huma­
nities' was accompanied by many expressions of 
concern over its practical implications and 
deeper significance. Critics worried about the 
various forms of knowledge-production which 
were being favoured at the expense of others, 
and about the medical/scientific practices which 
were propagated as others were marginalised. In 
the medical domain a sequence of ideological 
and practical objections was mounted to resist 
what some feared to be the total subordination of 
medicine to the methodological requirements 
and ideological claims of the natural sciences. 
Many observers honoured medicine with the title 
'modem science par excellence', by which they 
meant that medicine was the only true domain of
,. a sequence o f ideological and practical 
objections was m ounted to resist the total 
subordination o f medicine to the methods and 
ideology o f natural science'
scientia left. These authors maintained that largely 
due to its very subject matter: the patient, medi­
cine had managed to continue to be a rich and 
integrated scientific realm of study and practice 
in which 'humanities' issues and problems of 
'natural sciences', and issues of cognition, prac­
tical action and moral evaluation had remained 
inextricably linked. It was argued that given its 
core subjects of attention, medicine neither could 
nor should succumb to the 'two-worlds' impera­
tive (the urge to divide the world of science into 
that of natural sciences and that of humanities, 
with all the language divisions this entails).
Such counterclaims notwithstanding, the pub­
lic image of 'medicine as a natural science' had 
many powerful advocates. They strove to further 
modem medicine as 'biomedicine', based on the 
conviction that processes in human life answered 
universal laws of nature which could be uncov­
ered by good (i.e. experimental) research. 
Phenomena were supposed to be explicable in 
materialist structural terms. Knowledge could 
and would expand in a progressive manner and
many problems could and would be (technically) 
fixed. But even in the face of the increasingly 
strong public representation of medicine as bio­
medicine, critical questions concerning the precise 
relationship between various discourses related to 
medicine continued to surface and resurface. One 
of the main reasons for the persistence of these 
questions lies— it seems to u s— in the veiy 
composition of modem medicine as a self-organis­
ing and self-referential system. In such systems the 
issue of systematic self-reflection never wears out: 
being dynamic systems there is an in-built 
necessity to reflect upon oneself in order to 
perform the task of managing particular systematic 
insecurities. The patient will always be an influence 
in generating these insecurities. As system- 
theoreticians teach us, the self-referential, self- 
organising system will always continue to 
generate discussion about the best sites for these 
self-reflections. Similarly, it will continue to 
address the basic systematic need for assessing 
and reassessing the most appropriate terms in 
which such systematic self-reflection should be 
carried out in order to produce vital descriptions 
of the system.
If we consider medicine and its sub-systems to 
be such complex self-organising, self-referential 
systems, certain questions automatically follow. 
In order to compose the necessary vital descrip­
tions of itself, the system must address— in the 
richest possible detail— a range of questions 
concerning the elements it consists of. It must 
clarify which crucial interactions and commu­
nications exist within the system. It must 
explicate what the system as a system actually 
'produces', and through what kinds of relation­
ships of production. Furthermore it must ask, 
what are the systematic aims of production: 
producing 'facts', 'values', 'aetiologies', 'cures' or 
all of these things in different combinations? In 
order to assess such matters with some degree of 
sensitivity one would have to be clear about 
the relationships which are expressed between 
the system and its environment and between the 
systematic forms of self-representation which the 
system designs for itself and its Umwelt In this 
phase of self-assessment, the issues of 'goals and 
purposes' and 'processes of self-reproduction' 
automatically and inevitably occur, issues which 
concur with the dynamic processes of systematic 
ordering. Since self-referential systems are in
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principle dynamic entities, certain key questions 
concerning 'change over time' would also have 
to be added to all the above-mentioned issues. 
Observing medical systems through the more 
abstract looking glass of system-theoreticians, we 
quickly notice that clinging too rigidly to sharp 
divisions into language domains labelled as 'the 
natural scientific' and 'the humanistic' hinder 
medical self-description.
Beyond the Two-Worlds’ Perspective: 
The Convergence of Action/Reflection 
Studies in Medicine
For many years one simplified way to cast the 
division of labour in medicine was by allocating 
problems concerning clinical and research activities 
and procedures to the natural sciences, while 
allocating those of reflection to the humanities. In 
the decades after the Second World War this basic 
dichotomy was modified by the introduction of 
certain new types of evaluation. The term 'health 
care analysis' was first introduced to describe a set 
of internal, sub-systemic performance analyses, which 
mostly gave answers to particular policy pro­
blems, drawing on the rapidly developing intra- 
systemic jargons of epidemiology, health care 
economics, health management and 'quality 
assessment'. Little need was felt to engage in the 
vastly more complex task of considering the 
heterogeneous system of medicine as a whole, or 
of providing some necessary conceptual building- 
blocks for such system-descriptions. Until very 
recently most critics of medicine would shy away 
from the huge task of articulating what this larger 
systemic self-reflection might entail, and thus left 
the question of what reflective language could be 
developed to describe medicine in its current 
complexity largely unresolved.
The Search for Full System-Descriptions
Nonetheless, in various comers of the medical 
field there are signs of a growing eagerness to 
engage once again in the titanic search for full 
system-descriptions. Several strands feed into 
this drive. To the more traditional, yet laudable, 
efforts to 'build bridges across the "two-worlds" 
divide', often by merely pointing out the impor­
tance of 'social or cultural factors for medicine', 
new efforts seem to herald a more revolutionary
shift. Heterogeneous and disparate as they may 
still seem, these efforts are united by the wish to 
move beyond established dichotomies, such as 
those between subjective and objective, fact and 
value. The efforts are rooted in an interesting 
convergence of practices. Scholars who a few 
decades ago would work in isolation from each 
other, as if on different planets, now engage in re­
descriptions of medical practice which carry 
great potential for future innovative and inte­
grative system-concepts. If our diagnosis of the 
present avant-garde efforts in 'reflective activity7 
is correct, we might— at least in the domain of 
critical reflection on medicine— even be moving 
towards a dissolution of the 'two-worlds' divide.
\ , . w e  might even be moving towards a 
dissolution of the "two-worlds " divide'
Let us briefly point out two important trends that 
seem to support this view. Firstly, one can 
observe a widespread scholarly interest in 
medical and scientific practice. Across the fields 
of history, sociology, philosophy, ethics, and the 
anthropology of science and medicine, scholars 
are turning towards a study of the dynamics of 
practical work, Slowly, but steadily, the concepts 
of practice that emerge in these circles are finding 
their way into debates current in the heartland of 
clinical medicine, those which concern the 
improvement of practice and quality of care. 
Secondly, within certain 'hardcore' biomedical 
sciences, such as immunology, but even more 
notably in the cognitive sciences, it is possible to 
detect a quickly growing interest in organismic 
re-descriptions of the subject matter of these 
fields (multiple references to cultural, philoso­
phical and even religious awarenesses form an 
integral part of this re-written story).
The first trend, that of the reflective turn towards 
practice, is easiest to locate. It can be viewed as a 
third phase in the development of social con­
structivist perspectives on medicine and science, in 
keeping with a renewed interest in the moral 
dimension of medicine and science. From around 
1970 the theoretical vanguard of sociologists and 
philosophers of science has been engaged in a 
fundamental re-examination of the acclaimed 
relationships between social-cultural influences 
and the formulation of scientific knowledge. The
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first phase of this constructivist programme 
carried a clear political agenda. The main aim 
seemed to be to develop a critique of profession­
alism and professional autonomy, and to criticise 
earlier reflections on medicine and science which 
took insufficient account of the social influences on 
the production of scientific knowledge. The so- 
called 'strong programme' of social constructi­
vism, developed during this first phase (primarily 
by Edinburgh scholars such as S. Shapin, S. 
Schafer, D. Bloor and B. Barnes) advocated the 
research of scientific and medical knowledge in 
terms of economic interests and macro-social and 
political forces: the result was a critical vocabulary 
shift from 'intellectual development7 (located in 
the realm of ideas) to 'knowledge-production' 
(firmly located in a socio-economic domain). 
Rather than declaring scientific knowledge to be 
subject to progress in its own purely intellectual 
realm, these scholars' maintained that it arose in a 
complex production-process, open to social and 
economic analysis. Scientific communities were 
recast as communities of interest. In general, less 
attention was given to the contents of knowledge 
and the individual motivation of scientists than to 
the larger processes of the construction and 
dissemination of knowledge.
This first phase of social constructivism 
encountered considerable internal and external 
criticism. Critics expressed their fear that social 
constructivism would fall prey to gross forms of 
macro-sociological reductionism. By and large, 
writers such as Bloor and Barnes retained a clear 
distinction between cognitive and social elements 
in the development of medical and scientific 
knowledge, and between active and reflective 
factors and disciplines. In response, some sociol­
ogists of science began to promote a 
methodological modification which addressed 
the question: how precisely do social factors relate 
to cognitive developments in science? in more detail. 
Sociologists and philosophers opened up this 
issue while using ethnographic methods adopted 
from anthropologists. Their work brought 'reflec­
tive7 scholars into closer contact with the 
activities of scientists, whom they 'followed 
around' in laboratories and clinics. Within this 
second phase of social constructivist research 
some new concepts of space in science and 
medicine were worked out, together with several 
new reflections on the dynamics of the laboratory
and the hospital In their treatment of medical 
and scientific spaces, scholars gave much closer 
attention to the techniques, machines and other 
objects that populate these spaces and often 
dominate the practices carried out in these 
institutions. So-called 'thick descriptions' of the 
various scientific and practical sites also began to 
include references to how these settings 'insulate' 
themselves, or to what boundaries were drawn 
between these sites and the outside world.
A further step taken during the 1980s towards 
connecting the social and the cognitive elements 
in science and medicine more systematically was 
the development of network-analyses. In these 
analyses scientific production was conceived of as 
taking place in dynamic networks of human and 
non-human actors whose means of operating 
could be examined over time. Authors such as B. 
Latour argued that both entities were 'constructs'. 
Tacts' in these dynamic networks would always 
be co-produced with 'their legitimations'.
In the 1990s
In the mid-1990s we appear to be in yet another 
phase of social constructivism. The major and 
characterising shift has been from a primary 
focus on science as knowledge to science as 
practice.2 The more scholars joined the earlier 
movements to pay closer attention to the practical 
dynamics of medicine and science, the more they 
began to realise that scientific culture 'is made up 
of all sorts of bits and pieces— material, social 
and conceptual — that stand in no necessary 
unitary relation to one another While 
attempting to do justice to the changing phe­
nomenology of the practices of medicine and 
science, the authors sharpened their awareness of 
how 'disparate and distinguishable cultural 
elements' figure dynamically in these practices.2 
In providing re-descriptions of scientific and 
medical practice which do justice to this aware­
ness, such authors aim at breaking down the 
traditional boundaries between 'science' and 
'culture', indeed between 'natural scientific' and 
'humanistic' terminologies, often in self-con­
scious attempts to study the historical reasons 
for the divide.3 What emerges is a vocabulary 
designed to do justice to the mixed functions that 
men and objects perform in medicine and 
science— to the hybrid status men and objects
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have in the often highly artificial scenes that 
make up modem medicine and science. It is often 
in order to communicate these new awarenesses 
to others, that one can begin to observe some 
scholarly attempts to integrate these narratives 
into a more systematic revisionist account of 
science and medicine at large.4
Effects on Practitioners
To the practising physician, the above-mentioned 
trends towards fundamental re-descriptions of 
medical practice may seem high flying, or even 
somewhat gratuitous theoretical exercises with 
little relevance for day-to-day practice. Practi­
tioners feel under pressure to make quick 
decisions, in which conventional terminologies 
function and communicate far more safely. What 
need— they may w onder— is there for a revi­
sion of medical self-description and self­
reflection as radical as that suggested above?
.. simple dichotomies which derive from the 
old "two-worlds" divide no longer hold'
We believe that given the phenomenological 
shifts within medicine and science during this 
century, and especially given the massive entrée 
of technology into medicine, an adjustment of 
systematic self-redescription is long overdue, 
an d — given the systemic nature of medicine— 
fortunately also inevitable. In certain core areas 
of medical research scholars seem to share this 
view. And here we come finally to the second 
development we wish to mention: that taking 
place within certain 'hardcore' biomedical 
sciences. For instance, amongst second-genera­
tion immunological researchers since the 1970s a 
shift in language is discernible away from the 
19th century 'war' vocabulary of 'attack and 
defence' towards a language in which 'self'- 
expression is the key metaphor. Practically 
speaking, this entails a re-introduction of the 
subjective into immunological theorising. But per­
haps even more clearly the urge amongst certain 
medical researchers to move beyond the division 
between the natural scientific and the humanistic 
expresses itself in recent work in the cognitive 
sciences. Traditional ways of distinguishing 
'experience' from 'cognition', or 'internal biolo­
gical organisation' from 'the outside world' are 
being abandoned, with linguists, philosophers, 
neurologists and cognitive psychologists striking 
new forms of cooperation.5 Even while in-depth 
studies of these very recent and exciting trans­
formations are still largely lacking, one can take 
the fact that amongst the world's leading neuros­
cientists there is an explicit search for developing 'a 
sense of common ground between mind in science 
and mind in experience' in notions of 'the embodied 
mind', as yet another crucial indication that simple 
dichotomies which derive from the old 'two- 
worlds' divide no longer hold.
By and large practitioners look for what they 
have come to distinguish through years of voca­
tional training, practical work with patients, and 
processes of peer and societal review. How systems 
as complex as the medical or scientific ones change 
their direction and self-description is not easily 
explained. But if some of the work referred to above 
will spill over into the medical and scientific 
curricula, it may at least move students beyond 
the 'two-worlds' divide. There, we are sure, an 
exciting new universe of critical self-description of 
practice awaits them — one in which crucial ques­
tions concerning elements of practice today might 
be given the space not offered to them at present. 
Questions concerning the precise roles of objects 
and instruments, and the 'morality7 of technology 
are but two categories that come to mind.6
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